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Lower and upper bounds on the secret key rate for quantum key distribution
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We investigate a general class of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols using one-way classical
communication. We show that full security can be proven by considering only collective attacks. We
derive computable lower and upper bounds on the secret key rate of those QKD protocol involving
only entropies of two–qubit density operators. As an illustration of our results, we determine new
bounds for the BB84, the six-state, and the B92 protocol. We show that in all these cases the
first classical processing that the legitimate partners should apply consists in adding noise. This is
precisely why any entanglement based proof would generally fail here.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.-a
Quantum cryptography, the art of exploiting quantum
physics to defeat any possible eavesdropper, has rapidly
grown over the last decade from the level of a nice idea
into an entire branch of physics [1]. Indeed, first com-
mercial equipment are already offered [2].
A generic QKD protocol can be divided into two parts:
I) Distribution of quantum information and measurement
II) Classical part consisting out of parameter estimation
and classical post-processing (CPP). To implement the
quantum part of the protocol, the two legitimate persons,
Alice (A) and Bob (B), agree on some encoding/decoding
procedure [3]. We denote by S0 = {
∣∣φ0j
〉}j∈J and S1 =
{
∣∣φ1j
〉}j∈J , where J = {1, . . . ,m}, the sets of states used
to encode the bit value 0, 1, resp.. First, A sends n qubits
prepared at random in the state
∣∣φi1j1
〉⊗. . .⊗∣∣φinjn
〉 ≡
∣∣∣φij
〉
to B [4]. The adversary, Eve (E), interacts now with all
the qubits sent by A. She applies a unitary transfor-
mation to all those qubits and an ancilla in the state
|0〉 [5]. The state E and B share then is given by∣∣∣Φij
〉
BE
≡ UBE
∣∣∣φij
〉
B
|0〉E . Next, B applies some fil-
tering operation and measures his qubits in the z–basis
[6]. A and B compare publicly which encoding/decoding
operation they used and keep only those pairs of qubits
where they were compatible (sifting). The state describ-
ing E’s system is
∣∣∣Φi,kj
〉
E
≡ 〈k|BjUBE
∣∣∣φij
〉
B
|0〉E , where
we denoted by Bj the filtering operation used by B and
by k his z–measurement outcome [7]. A and B com-
pare now publicly some of their measurement outcomes
to estimate the quantum bit error rate (QBER).
The security of the protocol relies on the fact that E,
trying to gain information about the bit values, intro-
duces some error due to the laws of quantum mechanics.
However, any realistic channel used by A and B is noisy,
i.e. QBER > 0. In order to ensure that the protocol is
secure one must assume that all the noise (estimated by A
and B) is due to an unlimited eavesdropping attack, a co-
herent attack [8, 9]. A and B know how to counter such
an adversary: they apply a CPP, consisting out of er-
ror correction (EC) and privacy amplification (PA). This
general principle leaves a central question open: How
much error can be tolerated in order to be able to distill
a secret key? This is precisely what we concentrate on in
this paper.
Previous security proofs are based on the following ob-
servations [10, 11, 12]. Instead of preparing a system
and then sending it to B, A can equivalently prepare
B’s system at a distance by using an entangled state
(entanglement–based scheme). If A and B could purify
their state to singlets, their systems cannot be entangled
to E. The essential feature can be carried out processing
only classical data, leading to perfectly correlated data.
We present here a different, not on entanglement
based, kind of security proof for a class of QKD protocols
including the BB84, the 6–state, and the B92 protocol
[13, 14, 15]. First of all, we determine the state shared
by A and B (using the entanglement–based scheme) af-
ter a general eavesdropping attack. Then we analyze the
classical part of the protocol, i.e., parameter estimation
and CPP, for the case of one-way communication. We
present a new formula for the secret key length. Then
we derive a lower bound on the secret key rate involving
only entropies of two–qubit density operators. We also
present an upper bound on the secret key rate. At the
end we illustrate our results by determining new values
for the lower bounds for the BB84, the 6–state, and the
B92 protocol. These new bounds are generally stronger
than those achievable with entanglement–based security
proofs.
To study the entanglement based scheme we use the
same notation as before and define the encoding opera-
tors Aj = |0〉
〈
(φ0j )
∗∣∣ + |1〉 〈(φ1j )∗
∣∣ and the decoding op-
erators Bj = |0〉
〈
φˆ1j
∣∣∣+ |1〉
〈
φˆ0j
∣∣∣, where
∣∣∣φˆij
〉
denotes the
orthogonal state to
∣∣φij
〉
and
∣∣(φij)∗
〉
denotes the complex
conjugate of
∣∣φij
〉
in the computational basis for i = 0, 1
and j ∈ J . Note that those operators are not necessarily
unitary, e.g. for the B92 protocol. After applying one of
those filtering operationsA andB measure in the z–basis,
2associating to the outcome the bit values 0 or 1. Using
the fact that AT⊗1l |Φ+〉 = 1l⊗A |Φ+〉 for any operator A
and |Φ+〉 = 1/√2(|00〉+ |11〉) and that the operators ap-
plied on A’s systems commute with the operator applied
by E it is easy to verify that
∣∣∣Φi,kj
〉
E
=A 〈i|B 〈k|Φj〉ABE ,
where |Φj〉ABE = Aj ⊗BjUEB |Φ+〉
⊗n
AB |0〉E .
To account for all the different realizations (j) we intro-
duce a new system R1 and define the state |χ0〉ABER =∑
j
1√
pj
|Φj〉ABE |j〉R1 , with pj determining the probabil-
ity with which A and B decide to keep the systems in
case they used the operators Aj, Bj. Now, first of all R1
measures and obtains the outcome j. The state shared
by A, B, and E is then |Φj〉ABE .
Let us now introduce an equivalent protocol where
A and B additionally apply the following operations
[16]: (I) A and B apply both the same unitary trans-
formation, Ul′ chosen for each qubit at random among
U1 = 1l, U2 = σz, with σz one of the Pauli operators.
The equivalence to the previous protocol is due to the
fact that the state describing E’s system is not changed.
(II) A and B can decide to flip their bit values (both at
the same time). We combine the first two possible oper-
ations. The operator Oli denotes a unitary operator of
the form Ul′
i
Vl′′
i
, for l′i, l
′′
i ∈ {1, 2}, and V1 = 1l, V2 = σx.
Since we assume that both apply the same operation,
they need to communicate classically. This exchanged
classical information will be denoted by l. (III) A and
B are also free to permute their qubits/bit. Obviously,
they have to use the same permutation operators, Pm.
The classical information which has to be exchanged is
denoted by m.
We introduce now two random number gener-
ators, R2 and R3, which account respectively
for the operators, Ol and Pm. The state de-
scribing all the systems is |χ〉ABER1R2R3 =∑
j,l,m
1√
pj
|Φj,l,m〉ABE |j〉R1 |l〉R2 |m〉R3 , with
|Φj,l,m〉ABE = PmOlAj ⊗ PmOlBjUEB |Φ+〉
⊗n
AB |0〉E ,
the state shared by A, B, and E for the particular
realization (j, l,m).
Let us now relax the assumptions about E. We pro-
vide E with all the systems R1, R2, R3. Since she can
measure the R systems ending up in the same situation
as before, we clearly provide her with at least as much
power as she had before. The state A and B share is
given by the partial trace of the state |χ〉ABER1R2R3 over
E,R1, R2, R3. We find ρ
n
AB = PS{D⊗n2 [D⊗n1 (ρ0AB)]}.
Here the normalized state ρ0AB = trE(P|ψ0〉) with |ψ0〉 =
UEB |Φ+〉⊗nAB |0〉E and PS the completely positive map
(CPM) symmetrizing the state with respect to all qubit
pairs [17]. The CPM D1 is entirely defined by the proto-
col and is given by D1(ρ) =
∑
j
1
pj
Aj ⊗ Bj(ρ)A†j ⊗ B†j .
D2 is independent of the protocol, and is defined as
D2(ρ) =
∑
lOl ⊗ Ol(ρ)O†l ⊗ O†l , i.e. the depolarization
map transforming any two–qubit state into a Bell diago-
nal state. This implies that the density operator A and
B share, before their measurement in the z–basis, has,
for any protocol the simple form
ρnAB =
∑
λn1,n2,n3,n4PS(P⊗n1|Φ1〉 ⊗ P
⊗n2
|Φ2〉 ⊗ P
⊗n3
|Φ3〉 ⊗ P
⊗n4
|Φ4〉 ).(1)
Here, the sum is performed such that n4 = n − n1 −
n2 − n3, with ni ≥ 0. The states
∣∣Φ1/2
〉
= 1/
√
2(|00〉 ±
|11〉) and ∣∣Φ3/4
〉
= 1/
√
2(|10〉 ± |01〉) denote the Bell
basis. Note that this state is separable with respect to
the different qubit pairs. Note further that this result
(Eq. (1)) is independent of the CPP, thus, it can also
be used in order to investigate any protocol employing
two–way CPP.
The CPM D2 does not depend on the protocol and is
only due to the operations Ol. In principle, A and B can
apply (independently) any unitary transformations of the
sort eiθσz to their qubits before they measure them in the
z–basis. The state describing E’s system would then be,
up to a global phase, equivalent to
∣∣∣Φi,kj
〉
E
. This can
be also seen as follows: If the basis (say the z–basis) in
which a certain state, ρ is measured is known then we can
define a set of operators which are in the measurement
basis reducible to ρ. Any state of the form ρ′ =
∑
i piOi⊗
1lρO†i ⊗ 1l, with pi ≥ 0,
∑
i pi = 1 and unitary operators
Oi diagonal in the measurement basis, i.e. OA |i〉 = λi |i〉,
with | λi |2= 1 leads to the same measurement statistics,
i.e. |i〉 〈i| ρ′ |i〉 〈i| = |i〉 〈i| ρ |i〉 〈i| , ∀i. Obviously, the same
holds for operators acting on B’s system. Thus, if the
measurement basis is known, we can choose any of those
reducible operators. If furthermore A and B symmetrize
their qubit pairs by the operations described in (II) and
(III), then the state describing their qubits has the form
of Eq. (1). If we then provide E with a purification of
this state then we might only increase her power [28].
Note that the symmetrization described in (II) and (III)
commute with a measurement in the z–basis.
In order to analyze the classical part of the protocol
we partially use some of the information–theoretic argu-
ments [18, 19], which have first been proposed in [20] in
order to analyze security of a large class of QKD proto-
cols [29]. We assume that A and B hold strings Xn and
Y n, resp., obtained by measuring a given state ρnAB, e.g.,
the state presented in (1).
Let us first consider the CPP consisting of three steps.
The protocol is one-way, i.e., only communication from,
say A to B is needed. I) Pre-processing: Using her bit
string Xn, A computes two strings Un and V n, accord-
ing to given conditional probability distributions PU|X
and PV |U , resp. She keeps Un and sends V n to B. II)
Information reconciliation: A computes error correcting
information W from Un and sends W to B [21]. Using
his information, Y n and W , B computes a guess Uˆn for
Un. III) Privacy amplification: A randomly chooses a
function F from a family of two-universal hash functions
and sends a description of F to B [22]. Then A and
3B compute their keys, SA = F (U
n) and SB = F (Uˆ
n),
resp..
Let us introduce some notation before analyzing this
protocol. We describe the classical information of A
and B as well as the quantum information of E by a
tripartite density operator ρXY E of the form ρ
n
XY E =∑
x,y PXnY n(x, y)P|x〉 ⊗ P|y〉 ⊗ ρx,yE where {|x〉}x and
{|y〉}y are families of orthonormal vectors and where ρx,yE
is the quantum state of E given that A and B’s values
are x and y, resp.. Similarly, ρSASBE′ describes the clas-
sical key pair (SA, SB) together with the adversary’s in-
formation ρE′ after the protocol execution. We say that
(SA, SB) is ε-secure if |ρSASBE′−
∑
s∈S P|s〉⊗P|s〉⊗ρE′ | ≤
ε. Note that this definition leads to the so-called univer-
sally composable security, which implies that the key can
safely be used in any arbitrary context [18].
To determine the number ℓεn of ε-secure key bits that
can be generated by the above protocol, we use the fol-
lowing recent results: I) The amount of key that can be
extracted from a string Un is given by the uncertainty
of the adversary about Un, measured in terms of the so-
called smooth Re´nyi entropy, Sε
′
2 , S
ε′
0 [18], as introduced
in [23]. II) The amount of information B needs to correct
his errors, using optimal error correction, is given by his
uncertainty about A’s string (again measured in terms of
the smooth Re´nyi entropy). Combining those results we
find for the number of ε– secure bits [24],
ℓεn ≈ sup
V n←Un←Xn
(
Sε
′
2 (ρ
n
UEV )−Sε
′
0 (ρ
n
EV )−Hε0(Un|Y nV n)
)
,
where “≈” means that equality holds up to some small
term independent of n. In this formula, ρnUEV is the
density operator describing the string Un together with
the adversary’s knowledge [25]. The supremum is taken
over all preprocessing applied by A.
In the remaining part of this paper we show how a
lower bound on the secret rate, r := limn→∞(ℓεn/n), can
be determined considering only two–qubit density opera-
tors. To this aim we first of all fix some pre–processing by
A. We assume that it is bit–wise, i.e. for each bit value
Xi she computes Ui and Vi [30]. At the end we take the
supremum with respect to all those pre–processing.
A and B symmetrize their qubits pairs by applying a
random permutation to the state ρ0. Now we can assume,
without loss of generality, that the first np.e. qubits are
used for the parameter estimation and the rest, ndata, is
used to generate the key. A and B estimate the error by
measuring the np.e. qubits in all the different bases used
by the protocol, e.g. for the BB84, they measure in the
z- and x-basis. Since the state is symmetric and np.e is
sufficiently large, the data qubits, which can then all be
measured in the same basis, say in the z-basis, contain
the same amount of error. As explained above, one can
assume that the state describing the data qubits has the
simple form as in Eq. (1) [31]. Since the only free pa-
rameters are the diagonal elements λn1,n2,n3,n4 (see Eq.
(1)), the outcome of the parameter estimation implies
very strong conditions on them. In fact, conditioned on
this outcome the data qubits can be described by some
state ρn|Q, where Q = (n1, n2, n3, n4)/n is the frequency
distribution (depending on the parameter estimation out-
come) of a Bell–measurement. The state ρn|Q has the
same structure as the product state σ⊗nQ , where σQ is a
two–qubit Bell–diagonal state with eigenvalues Q. Due
to this similarity one can show that the smooth Re´nyi
entropies of those states are the same. Finally, using the
fact that the smooth Re´nyi entropy of a product state is
asymptotically equal to the von Neumann entropy [23],
we obtain the following lower bound on the secret rate
[24]
r ≥ sup
U←X
V←U
inf
σAB∈ΓQBER
(
S(U |V E)−H(U |Y V )) . (2)
In this formula, S(U |V E) denotes the von Neumann en-
tropy of U conditioned on V and E, i.e., S(U |V E) :=
S(σUV E) − S(σV E). The state σUV E is obtained from
σAB by taking a purification σABE of the Bell diagonal
state D2(σAB) and applying the measurement of A fol-
lowed by the classical channels U ← X and V ← U . Sim-
ilarly, Y is the outcome of B’s measurement applied to
the second subsystem of σABE . The set ΓQBER contains
all two–qubit states, σ, for which the protocol computes
a secret key when starting with the state σ⊗n, where σ
is any state that A and B might share after a collective
attack by E. Thus, in order to prove full security for this
class of QKD protocols one only has to consider collective
attacks. Note that, in order to compute a lower bound
V can be discarded, however, the pre–processing X → U
turns out to be very important.
In order to derive this bound we assume that Eve has a
purification of the state σ. This is always possible as long
as the encoding/decoding operators (Aj , Bj) are unitary.
This implies that, for instance for the BB84 and the 6–
state protocol coherent attacks are not more powerful
than collective attacks [32].
To reduce the number of parameters even further one
might consider only the set D2[D1(ΓQBER)]. It contains
only normalized two-qubit Bell–diagonal states, i.e. Eq.
(1) for n = 1. Due to the fact that this state is measured
in the z-basis by A and B (and so is the QBER = Q) we
have λ1 = 1−Q−λ2, λ4 = Q−λ3. The considered proto-
col, i.e. the map D1, implies then additional conditions
on those coefficients.
Using techniques from quantum information theory,
one can show that if the supremum on the r.h.s. is
also taken over any quantum state ρUV computed from
X , then it is also an upper bound for the rate r, i.e.,
r ≤ minρ supV←U←X [S(ρUEV ) − S(ρEV ) − H(U |V Y )],
where the minimum is taken over all states ρ = ρABE
that can be generated by an attack of E [26].
The case of individual attacks (n = 1) has been widely
studied, using a bound (sometimes called Csisza´r and
4Ko¨rner bound) which is similar to (2), but without the
extra preprocessing terms: X → U → V . A priori, one
might think that the preprocessing X → U could not be
of any help, since the only choice A has is to flip each bit
value with some probability, i.e. to introduce noise. How-
ever, this noise differs clearly from the channel’s noise.
Although it diminishes A’s mutual information with B it
may more severely penalize E. For instance, for the 6-
state protocol numerical optimization shows that for all
non zero QBERs it is always advantageous for A to first
add some noise to her data, before the EC and PA.
Let us now illustrate our result for several proto-
cols. For the BB84 the encoding/decoding operators are
A1 = B1 = Vx, A2 = B2 = 1l, where Vx is the Hadamard
transformation. It is easy to verify that D2[D1(ρ0)] =
(1−Q− λ1)P|Φ+〉 + λ1P|Φ−〉 + λ1P|Ψ+〉 + (Q− λ1)P|Ψ−〉
with 0 ≤ λ1 ≤ Q. After minimizing the lower bound
on the secret key rate (Eq.(2)) with respect to λ1, we
optimize over the pre-processing by A. We find for the
optimal values λ1 = Q − Q2 and q → 0.5, the probabil-
ity for A to flip the bit value, that the secret key rate
is positive for all Q ≤ 0.124. Note that if we would not
optimize over the pre-processing by A, we would obtain
the well–known bound 0.1100 [10, 20]. Since the state
A and B share, before the EC and PA, is separable any
entanglement based proof of security fails. For the upper
bound we obtain the known result that the protocol is not
secure if the QBER is higher than 0.146 [27]. For the 6–
state protocol we find that the secret key rate is positive
as long as Q < 0.1412 (known result 0.127 [11]). On the
other hand, the protocol is insecure for all Q ≥ 0.1623.
For the B92 we find a positive rate as long as δ ≤ 0.0278
(known result δ ≤ 0.0240), where δ characterizes the de-
polarization of a channel introducing the same amount
of noise [12, 20].
To conclude, we studied the security of a class of QKD
protocols, including BB84, 6–state, B92 protocol among
many others. We presented a new security proof not
based on entanglement purification for all those proto-
cols using one–way CPP. We show that in order to prove
full security one only has to consider collective attacks.
We derived a lower bound on the secret key rate involv-
ing only entropies of two–qubit density operators. It is
shown that A should add noise before the EC and PA
phase. Actually, this is why better bounds are achieved
and also the reason why entanglement based proofs would
fail here. We illustrated our results by presenting new
bounds on all the protocols mentioned above.
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